Are Jokowi doing the right thing to curb Islamic opposition?

It is obvious that one of the most consistent opponents to Jokowi’s government are Muslim Groups. However Muslim groups are heterogenic by political and religious preference. The Ahok case, where Muslim groups from various backgrounds including Nahdatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Islamic Defender Front (FPI) united in opposition, is an example of how Muslim emotion can be co-opted and mobilized by shared political interests.

This emotional manipulation of Muslims concerns Jokowi most. Jokowi understands that the disparaging campaign against his agenda, which has been characterized as pro-Chinese, Communist and anti-Islam, can achieve traction among Muslims. He needs to proactively counter and neutralize these narratives. Jokowi has increased his outreach to Muslim groups. In June he accepted delegates from 212 alumni, an organization that actively campaigned against Ahok (one of the participants is Bachtiar Nasir a flamboyant Islamic scholar andmember of Muhammadiyah and Indonesia Islamic Council (MUI). The meeting was organized by State Secretary Pratikno. However, the meeting does not mean that Jokowi has aligned  with 212 alumni. On the other side, Pratikno has been criticized for arranging the meeting, which Jokowi’s allies view as accommodating religious conservatives.

Over the past several months, Jokowi made at least three political movements to tackle the rise of conservative Muslims. First he formed Perppu Ormas (Government Regulation in Lieu of Law) which allows the government to ban anti-Pancasila organizations without recourse to the judicial system. Second, Jokowi formed UKP-Pancasila (Presidential Commite for Strengthen National Ideology), which is led by respected Islamic scholar Yudhi Latif, and comprised mainly of prominent Islamic scholars such as Said Aqil Siraj Chairman of Nahdatul Ulama, Maaruf Amin Chairman of MUI, and Safi’I Maarif former Chairman of Muhammadiyah. Third, Jokowi appointed Din Syamsudin, a Muslim scholar who has a strong relationship with 212 alumni, as Religious Tolerance Ambassador. Nevertheless, these steps seem inefficient and in some ways counter productive, as the Perppu Ormas is widely considered as undemocratic because it allows the government to bypass judicial system. Meanwhile UKP-Pancasila is not viewed as an effective tool for Jokowi to counter Muslim opposition, and recently-held  seminars were stacked with Jokowi’s sympathizers. Furthermore the new Religious Tolerance ambassador Din Syamsudin, who is a nominal Jokowi supporter but harbors huge political ambitions of his own. Din’s may be able to connect Jokowi with the conservatives, but at the same time his relationship with the conservative may spark concern and debate within Jokowi’s coalition. All of these recent moves by Jokowi raise concerns that he may be seeking an accommodation with religious conservatives and nationalists rather than devising a political strategy to counteract these forces in a way that advances Indonesia’s tolerant and pluralistic democracy.