Are Jokowi doing the right thing to curb Islamic opposition?

It is obvious that one of the most consistent opponents to Jokowi’s government are Muslim Groups. However Muslim groups are heterogenic by political and religious preference. The Ahok case, where Muslim groups from various backgrounds including Nahdatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Islamic Defender Front (FPI) united in opposition, is an example of how Muslim emotion can be co-opted and mobilized by shared political interests.

This emotional manipulation of Muslims concerns Jokowi most. Jokowi understands that the disparaging campaign against his agenda, which has been characterized as pro-Chinese, Communist and anti-Islam, can achieve traction among Muslims. He needs to proactively counter and neutralize these narratives. Jokowi has increased his outreach to Muslim groups. In June he accepted delegates from 212 alumni, an organization that actively campaigned against Ahok (one of the participants is Bachtiar Nasir a flamboyant Islamic scholar andmember of Muhammadiyah and Indonesia Islamic Council (MUI). The meeting was organized by State Secretary Pratikno. However, the meeting does not mean that Jokowi has aligned  with 212 alumni. On the other side, Pratikno has been criticized for arranging the meeting, which Jokowi’s allies view as accommodating religious conservatives.

Over the past several months, Jokowi made at least three political movements to tackle the rise of conservative Muslims. First he formed Perppu Ormas (Government Regulation in Lieu of Law) which allows the government to ban anti-Pancasila organizations without recourse to the judicial system. Second, Jokowi formed UKP-Pancasila (Presidential Commite for Strengthen National Ideology), which is led by respected Islamic scholar Yudhi Latif, and comprised mainly of prominent Islamic scholars such as Said Aqil Siraj Chairman of Nahdatul Ulama, Maaruf Amin Chairman of MUI, and Safi’I Maarif former Chairman of Muhammadiyah. Third, Jokowi appointed Din Syamsudin, a Muslim scholar who has a strong relationship with 212 alumni, as Religious Tolerance Ambassador. Nevertheless, these steps seem inefficient and in some ways counter productive, as the Perppu Ormas is widely considered as undemocratic because it allows the government to bypass judicial system. Meanwhile UKP-Pancasila is not viewed as an effective tool for Jokowi to counter Muslim opposition, and recently-held  seminars were stacked with Jokowi’s sympathizers. Furthermore the new Religious Tolerance ambassador Din Syamsudin, who is a nominal Jokowi supporter but harbors huge political ambitions of his own. Din’s may be able to connect Jokowi with the conservatives, but at the same time his relationship with the conservative may spark concern and debate within Jokowi’s coalition. All of these recent moves by Jokowi raise concerns that he may be seeking an accommodation with religious conservatives and nationalists rather than devising a political strategy to counteract these forces in a way that advances Indonesia’s tolerant and pluralistic democracy.

Anis Political Debt

Anis Baswedan won the Jakarta governor election after gained 57.95% of the voted, a strong mandate to Anis. Nevertheless, the 2017 election left several concerns, the campaign that preoccupied with racial slurs and religious tensions has endanger Indonesian democracy. Several groups and individuals with contracting background and interest are supporting Anis. The main question now is what would Anis do with so many interest on his shoulder?

Anis first steps is Internal consolidation among its supporters, Anis have several stakeholders that need to be serve. First he needs to secure parliamentary support from Gerindra a nationalist and PKS an Islamist party. Both parties will demand political and economic concession from Anis, nevertheless elites from each party have different interest, while Prabowo Subianto will look for 2019 presidential election and he will push Anis to support his agenda. Prabowo’s brother Hasyim Djoyohadikusumo is main donator of Gerindra, differ from Prabowo, Hasyim interest is economic access to several projects in Jakarta. While PKS position within Anis-Sandi administrative is complicated, first neither Anis nor Sandi have a good relation with PKS, second, PKS economic interest will be explore by their local parliament member, based on PKS coalition track record during the Yudhoyono era, they will ask for more administrative post within Anis administrative.

Other interest group is FPI (Islamic Defender Front) as notorious Islamic vigilante organization with massive support from Jakarta urban poor and lower class. Lead by charismatic leader Habib Rizik Shihab, this group should ask for more license and support on their religious activities, it means FPI will have bigger role in upcoming Anis administrative. However, one could not neglect Anis is also supported by several former members of KPK (Corruption Eradicated Commission), one of it is respected figure Bambang Widjayanto that actively helped Anis during his campaign. Comedian such as Pandji Pragiwaksono that have good connection with youth community is also Anis social media aided. Those figures politically less powerful compare to other interest groups, yet Anis personally comfortable mingle with those individuals, and they have popular supports. At least Anis need to feel secure by surrounding himself with people he trusts.

Some business interest, Harry Tanoe Soedibyo an ambitious businessman and well known Donald Trump business partner is joining Anis coalition. He also known for his ambition to be Indonesia next President, nevertheless it will be hard for him to coopt Anis since Prabowo have similar ambition with sufficient political resources. Lippo Group is the first taipan that publicly expressed support for Anis 0 rupiah down payment housing program. Lippo group lead James Riady is one of biggest property business in Indonesia. Just after the announcement of quick count, Abu Rizal Bakrie appears to express his felicitation to Anis and Sandi. Ical as most people called him is a former chairman of Golkar and ally of Prabowo Subianto during 2014 presidential election. He has huge business interest, one of it is property, he seems will develop partnerships with Anis in politic and business. Some othe business groups such as Bosowa lead by Erwin Aksa and also Kalla Group owned VP Jusuf Kalla are in the line to support Anis. Anis vice governor Sandiaga Uno will be main broker that connect Anis with other business group, Sandi himself is a businessman that have strong relation with Saratoga Group owned by Edwin Soerjaya. He also active member of Kadin (Indonesia Chamber of Commerce). Nevertheless, one should understand Jakarta is not Indonesia, moreover Anis political aided mostly run energy and mining sector which none of which in Jakarta, while most of Jakarta infrastructure projects are signed and funded by the central government. What they see is Anis could be a significant opposition over Jokowi’s administrative.

Jilbab, potret sejarah Orde baru dan Islam Politik

Beberapa waktu lalu, Jenderal Sutarman yang baru saja terpilih sebagai Kapolri mengumunkan bahwa Kepolisian Republik Indonesia mencabut larangan berjilbab bagi Polwan. Walau dinilai agak terlambat, keputusan Kepolisian Republik Indonesia itu langsung disambut baik oleh komunitas Islam dan kelompok pembela ham. Sebelumnya sempat terjadi polemik mengenai penggunaan Jilbab di Kepolisian, alasan utamanya adalah Jilbab bukan bagian dari seragam kepolisian, dan jelas seragam bukan hanya dalam tafsir pakaian tetapi juga idiologi.

 

Situasi dimana Jilbab ditolak diruang administrasi negara sekuler tidak hanya terjadi di Indonesia, di Singapura dimana Fan Page komunitas Jilbab di Facebook yang misinya untuk mengendurkan larangan berjilbab untuk pegawai negeri sipil di Singapura secara mendadak dihapus oleh Facebook, dan banyak kalangan menuduh bahwa itu adalah permintaan dari pemerintah Singapura. Baru-baru ini, di negara seperti Kanada yang sangat terkenal dengan semangat liberalisme-nya malah berencana untuk melarang penggunaan simbol-simbol agama seperti Hijab dan simbol lainnya dari Sikh, Yahudi dan Kristen.

 

Kembali ke Indonesia, larangan penggunaan Jilbab bagi pegawai negeri sipil adalah produk sejarah Orde Baru. Larangan itu pernah membuat ratusan perempuan Muslim bernegosiasi, mereka menggunakan Jilbab di rumah, tetapi tidak menggunakan Jilbab apabila mereka beraktivitas di kantor pemerintahan, bahkan beberapa sekolah dan universitas mengusulkan agar pelajar wanita tidak menggunakan jilbab untuk photo di ijazah dengan alasan agar mudah mencari kerja. Hal ini menyebabkan Muslimah berjilbab memiliki keterbatasan pilihan karir di era Orde baru.

 

Sebagai sebuah rezim otoriter Orde Baru memiliki mesin kekuasaan yang komplit, dari produksi idiologi dan sampai ke aparat yang digunakan sebagai alat represif. TNI dan Polri adalah produk idilogi Orde baru yang paling disiplin dalam hal menjaga apa yang disebut sebagai pengganggu Bhineka Tinggal Ika sebuah idiologi sekuler Orba. Dalam rekam sejarah TNI-Polri, kelompok Komunis, kiri dan Marxis, ditambah kelompok Islam Politik dianggap sebagai agen-agen pengganggu keutuhan negara. Contoh pemberontakan yang dianggap dimotori oleh kelompok Islam politik adalah pemberontakan PRRI permesta dan Darul Islam yang melibatkan beberapa tokoh dari Partai Masyumi. Setelah Orba berdiri, Soeharto menolak merehabilitasi Islam Politik terutama eks-anggota Masyumi, sebagaimana tertulis dalam suratnya pada Januari 1967 untuk Prawoto Mangkusasmita, Soeharto menuliskan: “Faktor-faktor legal, politik dan psikologis telah membuat pihak angkatan darat (TNI) tak bisa menerima rehabilitasi bekas partai politik Masjumi” (Yudhie Latief:2005). Surat Soeharto ini menandai hubungan antagonistik rezim Orde Baru yang penuh kecurigaan dengan Islam Politik. Sebelumnya Orba berhasil menumpas gerakan komunis dengan aksi berdarah yang menewaskan ratusan ribu orang, otomatis dalam awal berdirinya Orba Islam Politik adalah poros kritik yang signifikan.

 

Jilbab dalam konteks hubungan antagonistik ini adalah korban dari kecurigaan rezim terhadap kelompok Islam Politik. Jilbab oleh Orba diartikan secara sederhana sebagai representasi kelompok Islam ekstrimis yang bisa mengganggu keamanan negara. Jilbab bukan lagi dianggap sebagai pilihan religius individu, tapi sejenis bentuk pemberontakan sehingga setiap Muslimah yang menggunakan Jilbab dicurigai idiologinya dan kesetiaannya kepada Negara. Pada tingkat inilah Jilbab yang idealnya merupakan sebuah pilihan dan hak individu dalam mengartikan agamanya kemudian ditarik ke ranah politik oleh Orba.

 

Walau Singapura dan Kanada tidak memiliki pengalaman dengan rezim militer yang represif seperti di Indonesia, setidaknya ada satu kesamaan yaitu bagaimana Jilbab terdegradasi dari sebuah pilihan individu dalam mengartikan agamanya menjadi sebuah ancaman atas keutuhan negara, terutama negara sekuler. Di Singapura dan Kanada, penyebabnya bisa jadi lahir dari gerakan politik sayap kanan yang merasa Jilbab membahayakan identitas politik sekularisme di negara mereka.

 

Tentu saja persepsi mengenai Jilbab adalah representasi dari politik yang anti negara sekuler adalah tuduhan yang naif dan ahistoris, dalam banyak kesempatan kita menemui banyak perempuan berjilbab menempati posisi penting di pemerintahan yang menyokong negara sekuler. Sama halnya dengan tuduhan negara sekuler tidak mengakomodasi kepentingan agama dalam kebijakannya juga lahir dari pengamatan yang prematur. Negara sekuler seperti Inggris dan Jerman masih mengambil nilai-nilai kristen dalam kebijakannya, sebagaimana Indonesia juga mengadopsi nilai-nilai Islam dalam kehidupan bernegara, seperti hari libur keagamaan, lahirnya perbankan Sharia yang didukung negara, dan badan zakat yang dikelola pemerintah.

 

Ketegangan antara negara dan simbol-simbol agama baik di Indonesia ataupun belahan lain di dunia adalah akibat dari pergumulan semangat sekularisme dan aliran politik yang menggunakan semangat agama, yang kemudian berujung pada prasangka dan salah pengenalan antara yang religius dan yang politis. Contohnya adalah penggunaan Jilbab, Nigab dan Burqa yang pernah dilarang di Perancis, diperdebatkan di Inggris, dan sekarang penggunanya mungkin tidak boleh menjadi pegawai publik di Kanada.

 

Indonesia telah membuat kemajuan yang luar biasa dengan mengembalikan Jilbab sebagai hak Muslimah dan tidak mencampuradukkannya dengan pandangan politik pengguna. Walau memerlukan waktu 15 tahun setelah reformasi bagi Kepolisian Indonesia untuk mencabut larangan menggunakan Jilbab, hal ini harus dianggap sebagai momentum untuk terus mendesak reformasi di tubuh TNI-Polri, dua organisasi dimana semangat Orba masih bercokol. Lebih lagi reformasi TNI-Polri haruslah dibayangkan sebagai reformasi sejarah Indonesia, dan tidak bisa selesai hanya pada pengakuan terhadap Jilbab saja.

UMNO last political coupon: Malaysia for Malay Muslim only.

 

In 2008 the Malaysia Home Ministry threatened to revoke The Herald‘s license because of using word of Allah referring to the Christian God. The Herald is a Catholic Media, that providing news for about 1 Million Christian in Malaysia that mostly located in Borneo, Sabah and Serawak. On their editorial policy, they using the word Allah referring to the Christian God, just like where it used in Indonesia, Lebanon, Egypt and other Muslim countries. However the home minister believe its hurt the majority Muslim in Malaysia.

In response to the treat, Malaysian Catholic Church sued the government for violating rights enshrined in the Constitution. In 2009, the High Court granted Catholics the right to use the term “Allah”, a court decision that triggered angered Muslims, who believe the word “Allah” is exclusively belong to Islam. According to International Muslim Consumer Association (IMCA) said “The Malaysian Christian churches demand to use the name of “Allah” is part and parcel of their strategy to influence Malay Muslims to convert to Christian,” in their open letter to Malaysian Christian this September.

Recently the Malaysia government appealed against the court decision. Prime Minister Najib Razak said to Al Jazeera English “The concept of Allah is different in the Muslim sense than in the Christian sense, we should not upset the Muslims and Muslims should not upset the Christians, we are living in harmony for years and it should continue,” Prime Minister Najib Razak is supporting the ban of using Allah for Christian, and share a common thought with IMCA that the term of Allah is exclusively for Muslim.

 

However lately its not only the Christian who recently faced discrimination, previously the Home Minister also forbid Shia teaching in the country, therefor they ban 10 Shia organizations within the country. Shia in Malaysia is containing 250.000 followers that politically affiliated with PAS (Malaysia Islamic Party).

 

The recent situation in Malaysia has spark question among Academicians and International community on religious tolerant in Malaysia, in particular why the intolerant activity rose when UMNO the coalition party in power.

 

Despite the fact that UMNO has been using racial tension on Malay politics, UMNO has managed to revitalized Malaysia Muslim as moderate and tolerant. After 9/11 Malaysia Radical Muslim is under a hot spot, since two of 9/11 hijackers held a meeting in Kuala Lumpur 5-8 January 2000 to discuss the attack plan on USS Cole warship in Aden, Yemen, as well as discussion on the 9/11 attacks and how to send al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi traveled to Los Angeles en route to San Diego via Bangkok. Al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi are Saudi citizens that became the hijackers of American Airlines Flight 77 that smashed the Pentagon. The host of the meeting is Yazid Sufaat former Malaysia military officer. The fact that 9/11 terrorist has gain access in Malaysia put the country on hot spot along with Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

 

After 9/11 Malaysia under UMNO has fight to recover Malaysia image in International community, Malaysia massively arrested terrorist suspect and ban organization that have connection with global terrorism organization. UMNO also introduced one of the famous and ambitious ideological program named Islam Hadhari.

 

Islam Hadhari is formally introduced a year after UMNO won the National election in 2004 with 49.8% voters, beat the PAS (Malaysia Islamic Party) that only gain less than 4%, PAS are the famous Islamic party in Malaysia that promoting Islamic State. In total Barisan Nasional the coalition won 90.1% of the voters, a massive victory.

 

Abdullah Badawi, one of Malaysia prominent prime minister after Mahatir Mohammad, in 24 September 2004 in the UMNO National Gathering explain the concept of Islam Hadhari, that he said it stressed on the economic growth, moderation, tolerance and social justice, with bringing Islamic value as the core concept. Islam Hadhari could be interpreted as the Islamic Civilization, it also share perspective from secular to Islamic perspective. The government and the Ulama from UMNO have massively promoting Islam Hadhari in schools and Mosque. It’s become a symbol of reform in Abdullah Badawi administration.

 

With the spirit of Islam Hadhari in July 2005 Malaysia attended the Islamic International Conference in Amman, Jordan. Charismatic King Abdullah II holds the Conference. The conference is respond from the massive terrorism activity from Al-Qaida and other radical group. The conference outcome is to halt any radical view on Islam, and also refusing the Takfiri ideology (to accused another Muslim as infidel), and advance agreement is to recognize two Shia Mazhab Jafari and Zaydi as part of Islamic Mazhab. Malaysia, Indonesia and other Islamic countries signed the treaty that later known as “Amman Message”.  

 

Overall UMNO has managed to revival the Malaysia image and establishing Islam Hadhari as a portrait of modern and tolerant Islam. U.S. Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy Karen Hughes praised Islam Hadhari as a “powerful example” to all Muslims. Badawi’s deputy at that time is Najib Razak, he assured Mrs. Hughes that Malaysia was prepared to share Islam Hadhari with the rest of the world, bringing the moderate and tolerant Islam to the International level.

But why the phenomenal Islam Hadhari has lost its power on recent religious issue in Malaysia?

It is absolutely for sure UMNO has played ethnic politic in Malaysia. However for some time UMNO has avoided any political pressure on religion, not because it out of the UMNO agenda but moreover it’s very risky especially when they need to maintain a global image of moderate Islam. Something need to be bold here, UMNO also managed to bring Malaysia as compatible partner for global capitalism, indeed they need to secure the global investors appetite from negative trend that could harm the investment entering the country. And domestic political demography has pushed UMNO to not just rely on Malay Muslim voters, they need to gain voters from other race and religion, and Islam Hadhari is a good political machine to gain non Malay and non Muslim voters. But this plan in sudden change especially in 2008 national election, even though Barisan Nasional is still won the general election, but lost massive voters, Barisan Nasional only gain 50.27% meanwhile the opposition coalition Pakatan Rakyat won 46.75%. In 2013 general election, Barisan Nasional gain 59.91% (133 seats) and Pakatan Rakyat 40.09% (89 seats).

 

Based on the result of 2008 general election, UMNO start to change their strategy on the voters. UMNO knew that they failed to gain sympathy from the non-Malay and non-Muslim voters. They start to use the final card, which is Malaysia for Malay Muslim only, leaving the spirit of Islam Hadhari behind. Hence by supporting the ban of using “Allah” for the Christian, and ban on Shia teaching, UMNO has maintaining their potential voters for the next election. UMNO also supporting the IMCA statement that Malay Muslim is under treat by the Christian, therefor they need to consolidate their political agenda.

Meanwhile PAS that previously accused by the western country try to implementing intolerant Islamic politic has actively engaging a mutual dialogue with the Christian. In 16 September 2013, a dialogue session jointly initiated by PAS MP for Parit Buntar DR. Mujahid Yusof Rawa and Anglican priest John Kennedy had to run a gauntlet of obstacles from the protester that against the dialogue. The dialogue was finally held at a church in Butterworth. The interesting point is, in Butterworth DR. Mujahid managed to invite the protesters to joint the dialogue, and he promised that he and PAS will continue the dialogue to bring mutual understanding among religious believer in Malaysia.

The logic of discrimination in Virginity test.

 

The Prabumulih Chief Education Municipal Office HM. Rasyid has announced a controversial plan to conduct a virginity test to the female student. That test is a respond from the massive of free sex and prostitution activity among student. Rasyid also mention that he already proposed the plan budget and need to be approve by the local parliament. In a short time that plans triggered a public outcry that express critic over the plan, responding to the public outcry HM. Rasyid has declined the plan. However the idea was first announced is gaining support from politician, public bureaucrat and civilian. So even though the plan is drop, the logic is still there.

One of the supporters is Hasrul Azwar the vice chairman of PPP Party one of the oldest Islamic party in Indonesia. On the other side of Indonesia, Zainal Alim the Secretary of MUI (Indonesia Ulama Council) Pamekasan, East Java, even go quite far to promoting the virginity test as a law and obligate all female students to take it.

The supporters of the plan believe that the virginity test is the significant tool to cover and protecting morality. Of course there is other factor such as agenda to spend the national budget using any program even how insignificant and irrational the program is, it common in Indonesia public policy method, but the morality and sexuality discourse toward virginity test is the main concern, since that’s where the logic of discrimination lies.

To put moral standard on women personal attitude is not the first time in Indonesia, many believe that women should act properly in certain manner and moral standard. Previously Lhoksumawe Mayor published a letter that pushed all women to not spread their leg during riding the motorcycle. In Banten there was an idea to forbid women to go out above 9pm. There are two major point that we can see from issues above, first it related with moral issue and protecting women. Second it’s all happened in political level, the mayor, local municipal, and politician are the one who announces the plan.

The issue of youth prostitution and free sex is absolutely shocking for all of Indonesian, indeed it has to be tackled. But using virginity test is absolutely abusing women rights on secrecy of their genital, moreover women sexuality. And indeed it is quite surprising on the interest of Indonesian bureaucrat and politician on morality, they are tend to define the problem of decreasing morality such as prostitution and free sex is caused by women attitude. It’s not hard to define that it’s a discriminative idea regarding women as a single caused of moral decay among youth.

We may argue on the reason, the bureaucrat and politician always using the rhetoric such as “For the own sake of the student, and our future morality, etc.” Since massive corruption and sex gratification among politician and bureaucrat, Indonesian has reason not to believe on any words regarding morality from the politician. However what is worrisome is this kind of virginity test is another hidden agenda to found a legal basis for discrimination.

Indonesian political history has full with sense of political discrimination toward minority group, ethnic, and religion. Just to remind in 1958 Nationality Law published SKBRI (Letter of Prove Republic of Indonesia Citizenship) for Chinese minority that pushed the Indonesian Chinese to use that letter to have access any regular basis service for common citizen. In 1965, Indonesian government has stigmatize the ex-communist party member with obligate them to used red id-card, so any government official easy to recognize them, and forbid them to serve any post in the government or public service.

Those two cases are example how state discrimination is using a legal frame work through public policy, so any other citizen hold justification to discriminate the Chinese and the Communist in any level of social life. The massacre in 1965-1970 against the communist, raped, robbed and killing the Chinese in 1998 are the products of such as discrimination. 

And this virginity test is potential to be another form of discrimination. Lets say the student has taken the test and she failed test, she is un-virgin. What will happen after? The unclear agenda of the government is the space where the logic of discrimination lies. First it makes a fine line, between Chinese and Indigenous, Communist and Non-Communist, and it follows with stigma as unnationalistic Chinese and atheist communist. The same method to stigmatize could apply for virgin and un-virgin students. Virginity as legal basis that politicize by the state is not new thing, some government institutions in Indonesia especially the semi-military one, take virginity as compulsory requirement for recruitment.

The most ugly form of discrimination is where the discriminator act based on natural order to find a reason for discriminate against certain group. In regard of virginity, we already found how Regent Aceng Fikri divorcing his young wife because she already un-virgin, according to former Regent Aceng marrying un-virgin women its like buying a clothes that already broken. So the divorce to the broken/un-virgin women is legalize in natural logic order.

To be clear most of Indonesian is against free sex among youth and youth prostitution, but bringing virginity test as solution is another problem that could be as worst as the main problem. Before drop the plan due to the public outcry, the local departments of education propose or accept the plan as visible solution, rather than promoting sex education, religious teaching, or any preventing effort, they choosing virginity test. And the most surprisingly we found many of Indonesian, whether its politician or civilian supporting the plan.

That’s why fighting this kind of discrimination is not done after the local municipal drop and decline the plan, it’s the logic of discrimination that we need to criticize and indeed it’s a long term battle.

 

The Iranian reformist

In 15 June ’13, Hassan Rouhani a clerics and Doctor from Glasgow Caledonian University won the election with 50,7% voters on his hand, it is clear that he no need to take another run for second election. And until now there is no significant protest on the result, Interior Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najjar said that others candidate that unsatisfied with the election outcome may complaint within three days, its almost one month.

Rouhani is depicted as moderate cleric with low-profile attitude, he is the only Islamic clerics among other eight candidates, it turned six at when one candidate withdraw and tow other dismissed by the government, giving a favor for Rouhani. Rouhani also well supported by two ex-presidents Mr Khatami a reformist and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani that his candidacy proposal overturned by The Islamic Republic. Rouhani, previously served as the Iran chief nuclear negotiator under the former president Mohammad Khatami. Under his hand, Iran agreed to halt uranium enrichment and shown co-operative manner toward the inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Organization, moreover Rouhani is develop a mutual relations with western countries.

Rouhani has joined the 2009 Green Movement that protested on Ahmadinejad second term, and believed that the incumbent loyalist has fixed the election. The movement has brought one of prominent reformist figure Mir Hossein Mousavi on house arrest.

As a reformist Rouhani views on Ahmadinejad is clear: careless and miscalculate his policy on Iran internal situation, in particular playing antagonize policy toward western countries. Rouhani believe that Ahmadinejad political attitude has brought problem to Iran internal issue.  

The question is, how far Rouhani can go to fix that problem? Or how reformist is he is? First of all it is quite important to define what is the term of reformist refer to in country such as Iran that has survived the 20^th century with two revolutions, two world wars, two international sanctions, and vicious war against Iraq.

When February revolutions occurred in 1979, the Islamic group that led by Ayatollah Khomeine is not the only faction that promotes the revolution. From 1960 to 1970 the power in Iran has been in the hand of Reza Shah and his corrupt allied. Iran oil reserve has strengthened the Shah bargain position with opposition, and also foreign powers in particular USA and British.

There was a high growth rate of economy throughout the period, although differences in income and welfare between city and rural area is widening, and within the urban life itself. For the sake of stability, Shah eliminated freedom and critical political participation.

All factions in Iran reacted against the Shah, one of it is the Communist Tudeh Party that unfortunately cannot emerged from Soviet-Stalinist political style, that put Tudeh miss calculated the social-economy and cultural situation in Iran, make their political moves looks stiff and inefficient. Some other factions reacted against the shah are the landlord, intellectuals, professionals and moderate clerics. The famous Islamist faction led by Khomeine, that in June 1963 launched a revolt against Shah; the revolt was suppressed and Khomeine was later exiled to Turkey and eventually Iraq.

The Shah using Savak an intelligence unit that kidnap and torturing the oppositions. It is strong noticed by the Iranian that Reza Shah is back up by the USA. This lead to very negative sense against both the Shah and USA among all level of society in Iran.

Many Iranian foreign allies including the US start to criticize the Shah violent method in handle the opposition that run by Savak. In early 1977, Jimmy Carter became President of the United States, and he put human rights into his foreign policy agenda. The Carter administration suggested that if Iran did not improve its human rights record, aid, including military assistance, might be terminated. The Shah acted on Carter’s wishes, and some would view Carter’s pressure as instrumental in Shah’s fall. The Shah’s regime released 357 political prisoners in February 1977. The freedom of expression starts to occur. Mass protest start flooding the streets in Tehran and many other cities in Iran. The Iranian demand more inclusive economy, freedom of speech and fair political system.

In Qom a religious city 156 kilometers from Tehran, the massive demonstration start a little bit late. In October 1977, Musthapa, Khomeine son died in his bed, probably because of heart attack. But the rumor said it was Savak who did it. That rumor provokes demonstration in Qom, the demand is similar with most of other Iranian.

In the following years, the Shah seems cannot hold the power anymore. January 16, 1979, the Shah and his family fled to Egypt, and then to US. Iranian revolution is engineered by many factions, leftist, liberal and Islamist. However after the revolution, the Islamist get most of role dictating the revolution, its because the Islamic Ulama and scholars in Iran is relatively more consolidated from other faction, they are a certain social class and can coordinate their political view clearly. On the other hand, the Tudeh party is considered failed to consolidate the labor, urban poor and the leftist intellectuals in Iran, which actually plays a significant role in massive demonstration that suppressed the Shah. Except the Islamist, other factions in Iran are divided into small groups, and relatively less powerful compare with the Islamist.

Soon after gaining power in post revolution, Khomeine announced a decree to form an Iranian Revolutionary Guard (Pasdaran) in 5 May 1979, is to replaced all military official that previously served the Shah, however the role of Revolutionary Guards soon change, they often suppressed any internal disturbance and critical voice that follows the revolution, just like Savak in Shah era and Gestapo in Soviet Union. Pasdaran also plays important role in Iraq-Iran war, 1980-89.

The new Islamic state constitution has give power to Mullah (Islamic Leader) that resides in Qom. The Islamic State is not at a stage of capability to handle disputes with liberal, socialist and other critical expression toward the new regime. Soon after the revolution, the regime caught activist, journalist and intellectuals that have criticized the regime. Women social activity has been restricted, political activity are only applicable for those who in favor to the regime. Once again Iranian is screaming for freedom. In 1997, the first reformist in post revolution appeared as winner in presidential election, Muhammad Khatami. There was more freedom of expression, greater observance of legal process, less pressure on women, and improvement in international policy. However in Khatami era the anti-reformist has consolidated their mission, with backup from Revolutionary Guards, they supporting Ahmadinejad candidacy in 2005, that in sudden change all reformist policy from Khatami, especially in international policy.

Khatami leadership in Iran is the first era that defined what is reformist in term of Islamic Republic of Iran, which is openness; accommodate more political interest, freedom of public media, access to public spare and political transparency. Many anti-reformists believe that kind of policy is gate for western ideology entering the country. Meanwhile the reformist believe that, it’s the only way to tackle corruption, inequality in economic and develop fairness in politic. In 2009 when Ahmaddinejad won his second term, mass demonstration known as green movement criticized the election, it soon crashes by Revolutionary Guards, and Qom also condemns the movement. Rouhani was strong supporter of green movement.

The successful of Rouhani in Iran presidential election is a sign that the similar reformist ethic that was implemented by Khatami will be re-activated. Many Iranian felt that Ahmadinejad administrative has abused their social and political rights. However the question is escalating to the western interest on Iran, the western is demanding Iran dismantling their nuclear program, and reducing support for Hamas and Hezbollah. One of the most critical conservative voices toward Rouhani is indeed Bennyamin Netanyahu. “The international community should not fall into wishful thinking and be tempted to ease pressure on Iran to stop its nuclear programme,” said Netanyahu, adding: “Iran will be judged on its actions. If it insists on continuing to develop its nuclear programme the answer needs to be clear – stopping its nuclear programme by any means.” Netanyahu also referring on Iran support to Hamas and Hezbollah.

Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iranian nuclear program (which Iran doesn’t have a nuclear weapon yet, and Israel does) are part of regional security respond. Iran as well as many middle-east countries are under huge pressure on the Palestine situation, and also threat from Israel as the most powerful military in Middle East and owned nuclear weapon. To negotiate on the Iran nuclear program should mutually engaging all of regional security issues, it also including Israel political attitude toward Arab countries. Western country should lower down a bit their expectation on this matter.

Rouhani reform agenda will focus on fixing Iranian internal dispute with anti-reformist, and some conservative clerics in Qom that seems will oppose Rouhani reform plan. On the other hand, Rouhani will pitch long run of negotiation with western countries, Israel and their Gulf neighbors. And the most important is the Syria issues that start to amplified especially when US officially supply the rebels with weapons.

It is absolutely a hard job for Rouhani, he will face domestic conservative opponent as well as foreign. It is quite obvious that Rouhani with his reform spirit will propose a more moderate Iran to the world, however it is unclear are the western countries in particular Israel and US are ready for the new Iranian reformist.

Mohammad Morsi, Adel Mohamed al-Khayat dan kurma busuk dari Luxor.

Pada pertengahn Juni lalu, Morsi menunjuk Adel Mohamed al-Khayat sebagai gubernur provinsi Luxor, sebuah wilayah dimana Raja Tutankhamun berkuasa, 1332 sebelum Masehi. Luxor masih menyimpan kemegahan dan mewarisi situs-situs bersejarah Mesir Kuno, oleh karena itu bisnis pariwisata menjadi jantung perekonomian Luxor.

Beberapa saat setelah pemilihan al-Khayat, penduduk Luxor menggelar demonstrasi besar, membakar ban dan memblokir jalan-jalan, dalam waktu singkat demonstrasi itu bergabung dengan gerakan Tamarod (pemberontak) yang pada saat yang sama sudah menggelar aksi di beberapa kota lain di Mesir. Menteri Pariwisata Mesir Hisham Zaazou juga mengundurkan diri, sebagai respon atas dipilihnya al-Khayat. Tak pelak lagi, beberapa elit Ikhwanul Muslim juga mempertanyakan keputusan Morsi tersebut, mengingat al-Khayat merupakan anggota kelompok Gamaa Islamiyah yang memiliki sejarah dengan kekerasan, yang jelas bertolak belakang dengan semangat moderat Ikhwanul Muslim. Mohammad Osman ketua asosiasi pengusaha pariwisata mengatakan “Kenapa dia (Morsi) memilih seorang Gamaa Islamiyah. Sudah jelas Morsi ingin menghancurkan bisnis pariwisata disini.” (Al-Jazeera, 22 Jun 2013). Pertanyaan yang kini tersisa adalah mengapa Morsi bersikeras memilih al-Khayat?

Pemilihan al-Khayat adalah potret kebijakan Morsi yang kontra produktif. Tetapi analisis terhadap kebijakan itu cenderung lolos dari amatan kita dalam menerjemahkan faktor-faktor politik yang dengan licik dimanfaatkan oleh Militer sebagai “pembenaran” dalam menggulingkan Morsi. Maka mungkin perlu untuk menyelidiki sedikit mengenai faktor yang terlihat kecil dan sederhana, tetapi memiliki peranan penting dalam membentuk gambaran yang lebih besar.

Al-Khayat seorang insinyur berusia 52 adalah salah satu anggota elit organisasi Gamaa Islamiyah sebuah organisasi radikal yang pada tahun 1997 bertanggung jawab atas pembunuhan 58 turis di provinsi Luxor. Setelah rezim Mubarak dijatuhkan, Gamaa Islamiyah membentuk partai Pembangunan dan Pengembangan, melakukan koalisi dengan beberapa partai Islam lainnya, dan juga mendukung presiden Morsi, dan partai Kebebasan dan Keadilan underbow Ikhwanul Muslim.

Sebagai sebuah gerakan, Gamaa Islamiyah sangat terpengaruh dengan ide Sayyid Qutb yang oleh para orientalis sering dijuluki The Father of Modern Fundamentalism. Qutb merupakan intelektual publik, penulis, sastrawan dan pemikir Islam terkemuka, yang juga merupakan tokoh penting dalam sejarah Ikhwan. Ide-ide Qutb populer pada tahun 1960an, dia menjadi terkenal karena mengizinkan penggunaan kekerasan dan mempopulerkan istilah Takfir (mengkafirkan). Qutb di eksekusi mati pada tahun 1966, karena dituduh merencanakan pembunuhan terhadap Gamal Abdul Naseer.

Selama beberapa waktu ide Qutb memberikan legitimasi terhadap beberapa gerakan radikal di Timur Tengah, pada saat yang sama kekalahan Arab atas Israel, jatuhnya Palestina ketangan Israel, ditambah dengan kebijakan negara-negara Barat yang timpang di Timur Tengah telah menyuburkan semangat untuk mengadopsi ide radikal Sayyid Qutb.

Pada tahun 1969 Hasan al-Hudaibi pengganti Hasan al-Banna menerbitkan Dua’ah al-Qudah (Kami pencerah, bukan hakim) yang berupaya menjauhkan Ikhwanul Muslim dari pengaruh pemikiran Sayyid Qutb dan ide radikal lainnya. Pada posisi ini, Ikhwan mulai membangun jarak dengan gerakan-gerakan yang mengadopsi ide radikal. Dan memfokuskan aktivismenya pada gerakan politik dan sosial. Kader-kader Ikhwan yang direkrut pada kisaran 1970-an seperti Abdul Futuh, Essam el-Erian, Mukthar Nuh dan Abu el-Ela Madi adalah aktivis politik, dan menentang segala jenis tindak kekerasan. Perlu juga di pahami bahwa pembentukan Gamaa Islamiyah sendiri juga merupakan akibat dari semakin moderatnya Ikhwanul Muslim, yang kemudian tidak mengakomodir aksi-aksi radikal seperti yang dilakukan oleh Gamaa Islamiyah.

Sepanjang pendiriannya dari tahun 1973, Gamaa beberapa kali terlibat dengan aksi kekerasan. Salah satu yang terpopuler adalah keterlibatan Gamaa dalam serangan yang dipimpin oleh Khaled El Islambouly pada 6 October 1981 yang menewaskan president Mesir Anwar Sadat. Sebelumnya Sadat sudah di fatwa mati oleh pendiri Gamaa Islamiyah Omar Abdel-Rahman, karena menandatangani perjanjian Camp David yang memuat kesepakatan gencatan senjata dengan Israel pada tahun 1979. Abdel-Rahman juga terlibat dalam aksi pemboman World Trade Center pada tahun 1993. Sepanjang tahun 1990-an Gamaa melakukan beberapa serangan terhadap institusi pemerintah, Kristen Koptik, dan Minoritas Syiah di beberapa wilayah di Mesir, salah satu yang terkenal adalah pembantaian 58 turis di Luxor, yang dimana Morsi mengangkat seorang anggota Gamaa sebagai gubernurnya.

Pemilihan al-Khayat jelas adalah aksi bunuh diri Morsi. Tetapi Morsi tidak memilih al-Khayat dengan mata tertutup, dia memiliki beberapa alasan tersendiri. Setidaknya ada dua hal yang menjadi alasan Morsi dalam menggandeng Gamaa Al-Islamiyah.

Pertama adalah kenyataan kontur sosial di Mesir dimana negara sebagai sebuah badan administratif cenderung tidak efektif di wilayah-wilayah rural. Hal ini terjadi sebelum dan sesudah revolusi. Wilayah-wilayah pinggiran di kuasai oleh pemimpin suku, war lord, termasuk kelompok radikal. Penguasaan itu di dukung oleh tuan tanah lokal yang mendapat keuntungan dari kurangnya pengawasan pemerintah, dan keleluasaan mengontrol faktor-faktor ekonomi. Kelompok-kelompok ini memiliki kemampuan menstabilkan wilayah dimana mereka berkuasa, Gamaa Islamiyah adalah salah satunya. Kegagalan menstabilkan daerah-daerah pinggiran ini sudah menimbulkan dampak yang mengerikan dalam konteks keamanan di Mesir, situasi terakhir di Sinai adalah contoh terburuk, dimana wilayah itu dikuasai oleh kelompok-kelompok bersenjata yang membahayakan Mesir dan negara tetangganya.

Sementara itu Morsi mendapatkan kenyataan bahwa anggota Ikhwanul Muslim berasal kelas Efendi (Kaum Borjuis rendahan yang kurang diuntungkan oleh Kolonial Inggris) dan kelas terpelajar yang terpinggirkan, yang disebut Carrie Wickham sebagai Lumpen Intelegensia. Kondisi itu membuat Ikhwan tidak memiliki kuasa apabila berhadapan dengan situasi seperti di Sinai. Dalam tingkat ini berkoalisi dengan organisasi yang berbeda karakter seperti Gamaa Islamiyah adalah langkah strategis dalam konteks stabilitas.

Kedua, Morsi sepertinya menginginkan partisipasi politik dari kelompok yang sebelumnya termarjinalkan pada era Mubarak. Bagi Morsi dan Ikhwan salah satu kemenangan besar revolusi adalah kesempatan untuk berpartisipasi dari setiap kelompok terbuka lebar. Atas dasar itu keterlibatan aktif Gamaa Islamiyah bisa membawa kelompok ini kepada ruang demokrasi yang lebih luas dan pada saat yang sama mereka harus menerima konsekuensi dari demokrasi.

Gamaa sendiri sebetulnya menunjukkan prilaku positif menghargai demokrasi. Setelah protes besar di Luxor, pada 23 Juni Adel Mohamed al-Khayat mengundurkan diri. Salah satu petinggi partai Pembangunan dan Pengembangan sayap politik Gamaa Safwat Abdel Ghan, sebagaimana di kutip oleh al-Ahram Online mengatakan bahwa pengunduran diri al-Khayat merupakan upaya untuk meredakan ketegangan politik di Mesir. Di lain kesempatan al-Khayat mengatakan bahwa media sudah berburuk sangka kepada dirinya, “Saya sudah bekerja selama 35 tahun sebagai insinyur di institusi pemerintahan. Media sudah bertindak tidak adil kepada saya.” Tutur al-Khayat.

Al-Khayat memang anggota Gamaa Islamiyah, tapi belum tentu dia mewakili sayap radikal dikelompoknya yang membunuh 58 turis di Luxor dan pembunuhan Anwar Sadat. Tetapi masalahnya bukan itu. Militer, kelompok Muslim moderat, Sekuler, Kelompok Kiri, bahkan partai Salafy an-Nour, memandang pengangkatan al-Khayat adalah potret buruk dari kebijakan dalam negeri Morsi. Lebih lagi, itu menunjukkan ketidaksiapan Morsi dan Ikhwan dalam memainkan peranan utama dalam panggung politik di Mesir.

Ikhwan dan Morsi terlalu lugu berpikir bahwa dengan menguasai parlemen mereka menguasai Mesir, dan rakyat akan manut dengan segala kebijakan Morsi. Keluguan dibayar mahal ketika jutaan rakyat Mesir turun kejalan, dan militer Mesir berlaku culas mendompleng gerakan rakyat untuk menyingkirkan Morsi, yang kemudian menyebakan meningkatnya eskalasi konflik di Mesir.

 Kasus al-Khayat hanyalah salah satu contoh dari sekian banyak kebijakan politik Morsi yang prematur, yang menyebabkan Ikhwanul Muslim dan Morsi harus menelan kurma busuk yang dikirim dari Luxor. Ditambah kenyataan bahwa kurma itu tumbuh dari pohon yang mereka tanam sendiri, membuatnya jauh lebih pahit.

Racial and Religious Conflict in Asia Pacific, a Portrait of Postcolonial Condition

After more than two months, anti-Muslim riots in Meikhtila, Myanmar on March 20-22, ‘13 have left destroyed buildings and thousands of refugees displaced from their burning home. The three-days conflict has burned houses, mosques, and madrasah. Moreover, it killed more than 40 people and injured hundreds. Even though the situation seems going better, it still becomes a debate among intellectuals on what really happened. The most shocking thing is the riots involved a group of Buddhist monks that actively provoked the riots.

Compare with other religions, Buddhist relatively has less historical background with violence and conflict. The situation in Myanmar is bringing new face of Buddhist. In Youtube, Wirathu, 45 years old Buddhist monk, proudly called himself as “Burmese Bin Laden”. Wirathu and a group of monks have actively provoked movement against Muslim in Myanmar. They sprout 969 symbols in each Muslim store just to remind the Buddhists for not engaging with any business transaction with those stores. Wirathu said “It is our rights to only make businesses with our own people.” Wirathu continued, “If you buy from Muslim stores, your money doesn’t just stop there.” He said it in the late February, and the speech is available in CDs that sold in markets across Myanmar. “It will eventually go towards destroying your race and religion,” Wirathu and his monks believe that Myanmar businesses are controlled by groups of Muslim and well supported by Saudis and pro democratic party, LND that lead by Aung Sang Suu Kyi.

Wirathu leads a monastery in Mandalay, named Maesoeyein. The students see Wirathu as a full-spirit nationalist. The Buddhists 969 movement is well supported by monks from Maesoeyein Monastery. The students believe that the movement is a nationalist movement to save Burmese from any threats, in particular from the minority Muslim. Wirathu and his followers support the President Sein’s statement that Rohingya is not a part of Myanmar. They also depicted the Muslim with a racial term “Kalar”, a Burmese term that often applied for a person with dark South Asian skin. It refers to Rohingya or Bengali. “There’s no such thing as Rohingya. They’re Bengalis,” said Ray Wa Ta, 27, a monk who studies at Wirathu’s Maesoeyein Monastery in Mandalay. “They’re brutal. They rape girls. They’re Kalar.”

Despite the fact that Muslim in Myanmar less than 5% of the population, Wirathu and the monks keep producing anti Muslim preach. Politicizing the Muslim Demography, believed that minority Muslim will be a future problem for majority Buddhist in Myanmar.

This kind of issue is not new thing in Asia Pacific. In Bangladesh, for example, with Hindu approximately 16% of the population and Muslim nearly 83%, radical politicians said the Hindu is too numerous and well support by India. In India, despite the fact that Muslim is only 130 Million and Hindu nearly 830 Million, Hindu extremist stated that Muslim is running for majority, and through BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) together with communal organization such as Shiv Sena and Jan Sagh they promoting Hindutva, a practical ideology that promotes Hindu as the way of life, no matter what religion you hold. Radical Hindu keen that Muslim stays in India but they support Pakistan. In Indonesia, a group of radical Muslim also believes that Christian populations are heading to 50% by 2015. In fact, all religion other than Islam is only 20% from Indonesia population. Moreover, in 1998 tragedy, the Indonesian Chinese has become victims of groups of people that accused the Chinese are the main cause of the National chaos. Indonesian Chinese is stigmatized as not nationalists and pro-foreign rather than supporting national interest.

Why does this type of conflict that fears on other religion and ethnic arise in those countries? Racial conflict is popular phenomenon in post cold-war, e.g. Bosnia ethnic cleansing, Tutsi in Rwanda, Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, Kurds in Iraq, and many other stories on ethnic cleansing. They are actually referring to control the demography of specific ethnic or religion even social class, the objective is to maintain the counterpart size in a level of minority. However number in demography is only the purpose not the cause.

In Asia Pacific countries in particular post-colonial countries, the conflict seems look similar, but the embryo is relatively different. Maybe we may see the social economy that has been changed is a major factor of the racial and religious conflict. For example, a radical Hindu group rises in India along with the financial reform that changes India into a liberal economy that led by the Finance Minister, Manmohan Singh (Currently, India Prime Minister) in 1991. In Indonesia, one of the most notorious religious conflicts is in Ambon that happened when Indonesia entered the reformation era, that changing national political shave from New Order Era into more democratic society. Muslim-Buddhist conflict in Myanmar reached it peak when Myanmar changed their political landscape, allowing opposition to participate in the national election.

It looks like that political-economy changing is the solely cause. It pushes us to accept all the conflict only by political-economy perspective. If we traced the historical background in Myanmar, India, and Indonesia, we may see the embryo of racial and religious conflict is colonialism. It is already been known that any colonialism its not goanna productive enough in term of capitalistic productivity, if the colonialist is not promoting social engineering. One of the most important social engineering in modern era is social categorize, to define specific group and make differentiations from one group and another.

Colonialist helped those countries identified their people through categories based on social stratum, religion, and race. In India, the British has fully excited with census in 1871, to define India by religious categories, to define religion with their potential to support colonial capitalism or revolt against colonialism. In Indonesia, the Dutch in 1866 introduced Wijkenstelsel that segratgated housing for minority Chinese and Arabs, to separate them with Pribumi, solely to maintain social order. In 1799 report by the British, Francis Buchanan-Hamilton helped estableshed Rohingya as non-Burmese based on language, later on by physical appearance that posed Arakan Muslim and Rohingya as Bengalis. Those racial and religious prejudices in colonial era have become a term of reference for colonial administrative policy, for housing segregation, economy subsidizes, and to chose the domestic ally.

In post-independence, many countries using colonial administrative term to govern an independent state. In early-independence, Indonesia used almost 75% of colonial laws. Those laws were used to regulate relations between colonialist and their colony. Myanmar is using social-geography map that was created by the British, including the racial term. Indeed to create a social order a regulation is needed, but “order” in post-colonial condition is a term that first introduced by colonialist to support a specific interest. Sometimes, it is very discriminative. For example, Indonesia government used the logic of “Wijkenstelsel” that segregated housing for Shia minority in Sampang solely to maintain social order in Madura and Wirathu and the monks, that engineered an anti-Kalar/Muslim movement as part of nationalism, justify Myanmar only belong to a specific ethnic group. Those policies and social prejudice has make the Shia, Rohingya and Myanmar Muslim becoming alien in their own land, what kind of crime that can be more sadistic than making a group of people become stranger in their own home.

Sedikit Catatan buat saudara Hasan Haikal.

Dalam tweet-nya Hasan Haikal mengkritik pengkultusan dari Habib dan mengkritik asal muasal gelar Habib yang mengklaim sebagai keturunan Nabi Muhammad SAW. Hasan Haikal juga memberikan beberapa bukti sejarah mengenai bagaimana Nabi Muhammad menolak beberapa perlakuan khusus dari sahabatnya seperti bagaimana Nabi menolak dicium tangannya dan dibantu, sayangnya Hasan Haikal tidak memberikan perawi dari kisah yang ia catut, tapi saya tidak akan memperdebatkan itu.

Secara keseluruhan kritik Hasan bukanlah barang baru, dan Hasan Haikal bukanlah orang pertama yang melayangkan kritik seperti ini.

Tetapi ada satu hal yang hendak saya kritik dalama gaya analisis Hasan. Sebagaimana pengkritik konsep Habib, Hasan melewatkan permasalahan yang penting yaitu melewatkan wilayah kemistisan dan praktik-praktik sufistik dari konsep Habib. Dalam kritiknya yang sebetulnya terlalu singkat sehingga terlihat sangat sederhana dan sedikit provokatif, Hasan Haikal menggunakan logic modernis.

Satu hal yang paling vital dari karakter analisis modernis adalah verifikasi realitas dengan menggunakan rasio. Walau singkat Hasan Haikal bisa menggambarkan bahwa Habib adalah konsep yang sulit atau bahkan tidak bisa diverifikasi dengan rasionalisme. Itu terlihat dari ketika dia menyebutkan bahwa Habib adalah keturunan Abi Thalib yang bahkan belum masuk Islam ketika ia meninggal. Saya juga tidak akan memperdebatkan klaim atas kekafiran Ali dalam pandangan Hasan. Yang ingin saya perjelas adalah bagaimana Hasan mempertegas bahwa garis keturunan yang bukan patriarkal dinilai tidak benar, tentu argumen itu menolak kemungkinan atas konsep garis keturunan matrialkal (garis keturunan dari ibu). Sayang Hasan Haikal lupa bahwa Patrialkal adalah kebudayaan Arab, bukan kebudayaan Islam.

Analisis modernis dalam dunia Islam bukanlah barang baru, sudah dimulai dari Abdullah Ibn Wahab yang mengedepankan rasio dalam analisis text Al-Quran dan Hadith, lebih daripada itu pembacaan sejarah dalam Islam juga berubah. Sejarah kemudian ikut diverivikasi dalam bentuk tafsir-tafsir rasionalistik menggunakan analisis verifikasi modern, maka bisalah kita pahami penulisan sejarah dalam Islam setelah era Abdullah Ibn Wahab mengeliminir sejarah sufisme dan spiritualisme. Sejarah seperti Syech Abdul Kodir Jaelani dianggap sebagai sejarah yang penuh dengan Bid’ah karena Karomah-karomah dari Syekh Abdul Kodir tidak bisa di verifikasi dengan rasionalitas modern ala Abdullah Ibn Wahab. Mustahil rasio dalam perspektif modern untuk mentafsir bagaiman Syekh Abdul Kodir mampu berada di tempat yang berbeda dalam waktu yang sama, dan karomah-karomah yang lain yang mustahil dalam rasionalisme modern. Sehingga kemudian ide-ide non-rasionalis disebut tradisionalis, termasuk para Habib, Kiai NU dll disebut sebagai kelompok tradisionalis atau lebih sering disebut pelaku Bid’ah.

Saya tidak akan menggambarkan lebih lanjut mengenai ide rasionalis dalam Islam, tapi satu hal yang harus dipertegas Rasio tidak bisa disamakan dengan Akal. Dua kata itu lahir dari dua tradisi yang berbeda, dan memiliki praktik yang berbeda pula.

Tapi hendaklah saya sedikit pertegas pada tulisan yang singkat ini bahwa Hasan Haikal dalam kicauannya yang singkat itu, telah memperlihatkan bagaimana dia memberikan wilayah yang berlebihan dalam peranan rasionalisme modern dan menampik kemungkinan dari kebenaran-kebenaran yang spritualis dan sufistik (karomah) dalam konsep Habib, dan beliau terlihat mengkultuskan rasionalisme, sehingga analisis-nya atas pengkultusan Habib menjadi mandul dan tidak produktif dalam khazanah diskusi dunia ke-Islaman. Tentu saja pengkultusan Rasio yang berlebihan akan menghilangkan kearifan kita terhadap hal-hal yang dianggap irasional. Pengkultusan kepada rasionalisme akan menjadikan kita fundamentalis atau liberalis, karena itulah Liberal dan Fundamentalisme lahir dari ibu yang sama yaitu Rasionalitas Modern. Ini mengingatkan saya pada kritik Franfurt School atas rasionalitas modern yang menyediakan ruang atas eksploitasi dan dominasi.

Tapi tentu kita haruslah berterimakasih pada saudara Hasan Haikal, yang telah menggelitik kita untuk menggunakan akal dalam berdiskusi. Insyallah bermanfaat.

Muslim Politics in 2013

In his recent article entitled “Who is Muslim” that published in Al-Jazeera Online, Hamid Dabasi arguing on the common ground perspective about political tension in Egypt. According to Dabasi, voting for Morsi is nothing to do to vote for Islam, and vice versa. Dabasi main argument is the secular is also Muslim, and Ikhwanul Muslim is not represent the Muslim interest, it represent specific group with specific political affiliation, based on specific experience.

Even though the Ḥizb Al-Ḥurriya Wal-’Adala the Ikhwanul Muslim political wing won the election they still faced a huge political tension, not only against the secular but also conservative Salafy that well funded by the Saudis. In 2013, Ikhwanul Muslim will be in the hot spot of political debate among scholars and politicians. Even though Debasi is right that Ikhwanul Muslim is not represent all of the Muslim community in Egypt, but the Ikhwan represent the modern Islamic politic in post Arab Spring country.

For long-time, political organization such as Ikhwanul Muslim gain benefit through engaging their political slogan with Islam, it happened in other countries such as Pakistan, Iran, Malaysia and Indonesia. Even though some organization gain political support by their popularity in supporting Islamic nuance, some other are not.

In Indonesia for example for the last five years Indonesian has becoming more religious than before. Muslim is often gathering for collective ritual such as Majelis Taklim in Mosque or other public spare, the Sharia Banking product is also increasing, more and more youth Muslim expressing their religion through social and political activity. Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah, NU, DDII gains so many supporters. Those organization is involved directly into the major problems of Muslim community, they build school and education centre, empowering the Muslim community in rural area, they becoming very popular among the Muslim community in Indonesia. However the Rising of Islam in Indonesia does not follow by the Islamic Political Party.

The Islamic Parties in Indonesia are considered failed in 2009 national election. From the share in the parliament PKS (Prosperous Justice Party) gain 7% and PPP (United Development Party) gain 5%, the other parties PAN (National Mandate Party) and PKB (National Awakening Party) prefer to stay as secular-nationalist party with Islamic nuance. The problem of Islamic Party in Indonesia is they don’t really touch the fundamental issue among Muslim community, which are poverty and access to education. In daily political practice, the Islamic party is seems to stay away from that issue and also from national issue such as corruption, labour issue, and democracy. The Islamic parties often focusing their work on implementing Sharia Law.

Sharia Law whatsoever is a product of political experience from 20^th century in era of postcolonial in Mid East. The establishment of Sharia Law is different, depending on the Islamic Political experience and Islamic teaching in each country. Iran, Pakistan and Saudi are practicing different system of Sharia Law.

The focus of Islamic teaching in Indonesia is quite different from the spirit of Sharia Law that spread in Mid East, Islamic teaching in Indonesia focusing on Fiqih (four Mazhab) and Adab (Self Ethic), that already been taught before 20^th century. Indonesia has a different Islamic experience with Mid East, that’s why the Sharia law is unpopular in Indonesia. However the spirit of Islamic teaching is indeed influencing Indonesia constitution and administration, the first point of Pancasila and the establishment of Religious Court are the example.

This unique condition of Indonesian Muslim is failed to recognize by the most of Islamic Political Party. The PKS has the best cadres program among other parties, most of the scholars from Tarbiyah Party (PKS) failed to recognize this situation.

The PKS its self is formed with the spirit of Ikhwanul Muslim, most of the PKS Scholars is well familiar with the Ikhwanul Muslim thinker, the next issue is they cannot reproduce the Ikhwanul Muslim thought into Indonesia context. On the other hand the party elites becoming too pragmatic. However if we talked about the Islamic Political Party, PKS still the strongest Party with loyal and well-trained cadres.

The other Islamic Political Party, PPP, is struggling to go out from the image of pro-government party in post new order era. The PPP seems hard to find new and young figure, frankly speaking they doesn’t even have a figure.

However the decline of Islamic Political Party will not affected the Muslim Politicians, Scholars and public intellectuals. Muhammadiyah and NU is getting more popular among the Muslim Community, even to the non-Muslim. Muslim intellectuals such as Komarudin Hidayat, Anis Baswedan, Din Syamsudin, famously known as National figure rather than Islamic Figure.

Muslim voters also getting sure on their political perspective and interest, the DKI Jakarta Governor election is the proof on how Muslim community used their voice, not based on unrealistic sentimental reason, but based on ability and performance of the candidate.

In 2013, we may see another significant progress on Islamic Politics. The Islamic Political Party will repair their image and looking for more significant program toward the Muslim community. Meanwhile the Muslim community will enter the stage where their interest will be politicize by the politicians for national election in 2014. That’s where the Indonesian Muslim will exercise their political maturity to resist any form of political commodification.

At international level, the Muslim community also faced similar things, Palestine now non-state observer in UN, Ikhwanul Muslim still struggling to run democracy in Egypt, Iran-Israel tension and Arab Uprising in Mid East, all will allure a debate among Muslim Scholars around the world. There will be many challenges to the Muslim world upfront. Moreover there is a huge probability that the Muslim self-political identity will change, scholarship and intellectuals movement will plays a major part rather than an Islamic Political party.

Just like what Debasi mention at the end of his article: “This world and its fragility require a renewed pact, a planetary self-reflection, a manner and mood of entrusting itself to itself. Thinking through this possibility requires a new agency I wish to identify with the category of a Muslim intellectual, rooted in a renewed organicity that must be conscious of its worldliness.”